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Sneddon
on Action and Responsibility
Katarzyna Paprzycka
University of Warsaw
Abstract.
The paper is a critical discussion of Sneddon’s recent proposal to
revive ascriptivism in philosophy of action. Despite his declarations,
Sneddon fails in his central task of giving an account of the
distinction between actions and mere happenings. His failure is due to
three major problems. First, the account is based on a misconceived
methodology of “type” necessary and “token” sufficient conditions.
Second, the “type” necessary condition he proposes is so weak that the
connection that obtains between action and responsibility also obtains
between action and lack of responsibility. Third, neither the idea of
responsibility nor the idea of defeating conditions is elucidated
sufficiently to play any role in understanding what it is to be an
action.
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