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Understanding as Endorsing an Inference
Andrew Jorgensen
University College Dublin
Abstract.
Fodor & Lepore (2001) and Williamson (2003) attack the inferentialist
account of concept possession according to which possessing or
understanding a concept requires endorsing the inference patterns
constitutive of its content. I show that Fodor & Lepore's concern – that
the conception places an exorbitant epistemological demands on
possessors of a concept – is met by Brandom's tolerance of materially
bad nonconservative inferences. Such inferences themselves, as
Williamson argues, present difficulties for the 'understanding as
endorsement' conception. I show that, properly understood, Brandom's
broad conception of inferential role, which encompasses social-perspectival
inferential connections, has the resources to respond to Willianson's
challenge.
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