|
Two Critical Contributions to the Problem of Truth and Meaning
Jan
Woleński
Jagiellonian
University,
Kraków
Abstract :
This
paper
critically
discusses
two
points
concerning
some
recent
views
about
the
concept
of
truth.
Firstly,
contrary
to
Davidson,
it
shows
that
meaning
of
sentences
cannot
be
explicated
by
T-equivalences.
In
particular,
“is
true”
is
an
extensional
predicate,
but
“means
that”
an
intensional
one.
Secondly,
the
minimalist
account
of
truth
does
not
provide
a
satisfactory
analysis
of
the
concept
of
falsity.
In
this
respect,
minimalism
does
not
satisfy
Russell's
claim
that
any
adequate
truth-theory
must
be
a
theory
of
falsity
as
well.
Back |
