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Dispositions and Meinongian Objects
Jan
Hauska
Szczecin University
Abstract:
Questions concerning causal involvement of empirical properties have
recently given rise to a lively philosophical controversy known as the
debate about dispositions. I begin with a description of the focal points
of the debate: the issue of the viability of the conditional analysis of
dispositions, the question of whether or not they ultimately constitute a
distinct kind of properties, the conundrum concerning their causal
efficacy, and finally the bold suggestion that all properties are
dispositional. Along the way I sketch current theories of the nature of
dispositions. Then I draw a fuller picture of dispositionalism, i.e. of
the family of positions united by embracing the ontological distinctness
of dispositions and their causal efficacy. I conclude by defending
dispositionalism against the objection, raised by David Armstrong, that it
is committed to the existence of Meinongian objects.
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