

Book Reviews

David Copp, *Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics*, New York: Cambridge University Press 2007, pp. XIII + 361, ISBN 9780521863711.

In *Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics*, David Copp provides a collection of essays defending moral naturalism and realism, along with various related theses. In particular, Copp makes it the chief aim of the book to defend a particular version of moral naturalism and to argue that this version of moral naturalism can explain the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning moral realism (p. 3). Copp is attempting to reply to the widely held view that to avoid moral nihilism one must take up either nonnaturalism or noncognitivism. The book is composed of a substantial introduction and ten chapters divided into three parts. The chapters include seven previously published essays with only minor changes, and three essays which have not been published before. Each essay was written to stand alone, thus it is not necessary to read the book from beginning to end. However, it does strike me as advantageous to do so, as the order of the essays builds a coherent argument addressing the issues in a helpful progression.

Part 1 contains four chapters, two of which are previously unpublished essays, outlining Copp's view of moral naturalism while discussing some of the central epistemological and metaphysical issues relevant to moral naturalism. Chapters 1 and 2 develop a particular epistemological idea of moral properties as natural properties while addressing particular objections to this view. Copp defines ethical naturalism in the following passage:

An ethical naturalist holds that there are moral properties and relations—for example, there are moral rightness, goodness, justice, and virtuousness—and she holds that these properties and relations are 'natural.' Accordingly, when a naturalist hears us say that something is right or wrong, just or unjust, she takes the truth of what we say to depend on whether the relevant thing has the relevant property, and she takes this to depend in turn exclusively on the way things are in the natural world. (p. 33)

Copp uses definitions for moral naturalism similar to this one throughout the book, which brings out one of the book's shortcomings, although a minor one, that is due to its composition as a collection of essays. Since the essays were written to stand alone, some terrain is covered multiple times in similar but not identical ways, and one might nitpick over which definition is the final word. Such a shortcoming is common amongst collections of essays. However, the accumulated argument and inclusion of the new essays more than compensates for this problem.

In the opening essay, Copp combines moral naturalism with moral realism and simply takes moral realism as given without defending it. His goal is not to defend moral realism, but to investigate the naturalistic version of realism. Importantly, Copp carefully explains that it is our empirical epistemological access to natural properties which separates natural from nonnatural properties. As he states it, "A property is natural if and only if any synthetic proposition about its instantiation that can be known, could only be known empirically" (p. 39). Copp provides here an argument for ethical naturalism that is not meant to be decisive, but merely to motivate why one might be a naturalist. Ethical naturalism, as stated here, is committed to denying synthetic a priori moral truths. Thus, Copp argues against the plausibility of synthetic a priori moral truths by arguing for empirical defeaters; namely, that there are possible experiences that would provide *prima facie* evidence against any synthetic moral generality, whether it be a priori or a posteriori. Copp continues this discussion in the essay comprising the second chapter concerning naturalized epistemology by addressing various objections to the claim that moral truths are empirical. Additionally, the essay attempts to illustrate that ethical naturalism can exist within a framework of naturalized epistemology, i.e. an epistemological view which is psychologically plausible. Copp here begins to rely upon the "society-centered theory" which he develops elsewhere. I will return to this point later.

Chapters 3 and 4 take up metaphysical issues relating morality to truth and necessity. Chapter 3 argues that the claim that some common-sense moral propositions are self-evident, e.g. that it is wrong to torture other people just for fun, is compatible with moral naturalism. The difficulty is that such self-evident propositions appear knowable a priori and do not rely upon empirical information to be known. Copp argues that a synthetic and empirically defeasible proposition could be self-evident. Copp is arguing that the common-sense principles which are synthetic and self-evident, i.e. normally considered a priori, are empirically defeasible. By establishing this, Copp is hoping to show that the move allows compatibility of moral naturalism with self-evidence. Whether or not most

naturalists will rest happily with this view has not yet been seen; however, Copp appears to be giving up much ground in regards to self-evidence to the nonnaturalists by holding the empirical aspect as an epistemological defeater only.

Chapter 4 focuses upon determining the grounding of moral necessities and establishing that only certain kinds of moral naturalism are capable of establishing this grounding. The kinds of moral naturalism capable of establishing moral necessities must be committed to an identity thesis where a nonmoral predicate is identical to a moral predicate; Copp calls this a “T-identity thesis.” Such a thesis enables a property ascribed by a nonmoral predicate to be identical to the property ascribed by a moral predicate. Copp identifies two relevant types of naturalism which can identify such a principle, both “conceptual naturalism” and “metaphysical naturalism.” The difference is whether the T-identity thesis claims the identity to be a conceptual truth, or a metaphysical necessity and not a conceptual truth. Copp then identifies various forms of each, including his own metaphysical naturalism contained in the society-centered theory, capable of proposing such T-identity theses. As Copp states, “moral necessities cannot be explained as conceptual or metaphysical necessities unless a theory that proposes a T-identity thesis can be defended. Such theories are typically naturalistic, for it is typical of nonnaturalism to take moral properties to be unanalyzable” (p. 148). Thus, Copp concludes the first part of the book by arguing in favor of moral naturalism, due to its ability to account for moral necessities.

Part 2 contains three chapters, one previously unpublished essay, primarily concerned with moral semantics. Chapter 5 takes the position, against conativism, that moral predicates do not only express attitudes but also ascribe properties. Copp combines aspects of two moral theories normally conceived as incompatible, moral realism and anti-realist expressivism, as “realist-expressivism.” As Copp states the view, “It holds that our moral beliefs and judgments represent moral states of affairs and can be accurate or inaccurate to those states of affairs, which is the central realist thesis, but it also holds that, in making moral assertions, we express certain characteristic conative attitudes or motivational stances, which is a central positive view of expressivism” (p. 154). Copp both explains and defends this little noticed possible combination in the essay. He illustrates that the claim of expressivism is not necessarily an anti-realist claim, as expressivism is centrally a claim about moral discourse which is not committed to either realism or anti-realism. The defense of realist-expressivism relies upon the theoretical advantages of being able to address the classical weaknesses of realism, e.g. open-question arguments, the naturalistic fallacy, etc., while taking up the strengths of the view of

moral discourse provided by expressivism. Interestingly, realist-expressivism returns in the discussion of normativity later in the book.

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the reference of moral predicates to natural properties within Putnamian semantic theory. In Chapter 6, Copp is primarily concerned to show that the “Moral Twin Earth argument” put forward by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons is not successful in undermining the claim of synthetic moral naturalism that “for any moral property, there is a synthetic truth to the effect that the property is identical to a certain natural property” (p. 203). The Moral Twin Earth argument utilizes Putnam’s famous example to argue that there are no synthetic truths identifying a moral property with a natural property, given Putnamian semantics. Copp replies by attempting to illustrate that synthetic moral naturalism can accommodate the intuitions which drive the Moral Twin Earth argument. What is most important in this volume, however, is the second and new essay concerning this topic. Horgan and Timmons are not satisfied with the replies provided by Copp and provide a new challenge in the form of a dilemma. They believe that Copp’s view either fails to determine particular relations between moral terms and natural properties or is committed to an unacceptable form of relativism in which individuals from different groups appear to utter contradictory moral statements, but do not have a genuine moral disagreement. Copp attempts to avoid this challenge by more fully developing Putnamian semantics within a more complete metaethical theory. Copp, while recognizing some shortcomings of the suggestion, combines his society-centered theory with Putnamian semantics to avoid the dilemma.

Part 3 contains three chapters concerned primarily with the normativity of moral judgment. Copp begins this section by systematically considering whether moral naturalism is ruled out by the normativity of morality. G. E. Moore’s open question argument and J. L. Mackie’s argument from queerness are both invoked as providing the classical challenge to moral naturalism. Copp identifies three different degrees of normativity, i.e. generic, motivational, and authoritative, and argues that moral naturalism can account for all three forms of normativity; whether or not they are even part of morality, which issue is also addressed by Copp. Importantly, authoritative normativity is the most stringent form of normativity and Copp is not convinced that morality contains such normativity. Thus, even if it turned out that moral naturalism failed to account for authoritative normativity, it would not harm arguments for moral naturalism.

Chapters 9 and 10 provide discussions of practical rationality. Chapter 9 provides a discussion of the conflict between morality and self-interest. Copp here assumes there are cases when morality and self-interest conflict. He then argues that neither overrides the other, but instead that morality and self-interest provide different kinds of reasons and rejects the

idea that in all situations there exists one overall verdict, a “Reason-as-such.” Thus, Copp here argues against the unity of practical reason. Chapter 10 then attempts to propose and ground, in the Kantian sense, a view of practical rationality. Copp believes that a theory of rationality must identify the content of the standard while grounding that standard of rationality. Copp attempts to do both in this final essay by placing autonomy at the center of practical reason. The view draws heavily upon Kantian literature and connects back to the type of reasons pluralism defended in the previous chapter. Copp ends by acknowledging the modesty of his overall suggestion here.

Morality in a Natural World is clearly an important and central addition to the metaethical literature. However, there are weaknesses in the book. One problem with the book revolves around the “society-centered theory” which Copp points towards and relies upon at various places throughout the book. Copp develops the view in other works and only makes mention of it here, without development in these essays. The incompleteness of the view is a problem, given the place the theory holds as the central point of reference in several arguments. Additionally, the way the theory is defended here opens the door for concerns of relativism, usually eliminated by moral realism. In conclusion, the book is quite technical and is best suited for individuals already familiar with the debates concerning metaethics in general, and naturalism in particular, as the text becomes increasingly challenging as it progresses.

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Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (eds.), *Experimental Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, XX + 256pp., ISBN 9780195323269.

Experimental philosophy is a new approach to philosophy that incorporates the methodologies of psychology, behavioral economics, and sociology. Experimental philosophers generally maintain that, in addition to traditional philosophical practices, these ways of gathering evidence can be instrumental in shedding light on philosophically important issues. Rather than relying on their own intuitions about specific cases, experimental philosophers perform systematic experiments to determine what intuitions people have about those cases. These intuitions then serve as evidence from which experimental philosophers work.

Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols's anthology introduces the reader to this exciting new way of doing philosophy. The readings include pioneering experimental pieces in areas such as epistemology, intentional action, philosophy of language, free will, and moral responsibility. The papers nicely highlight the typical methods that experimental philosophers use. Indeed, four of the twelve papers in this collection have not appeared previously, making this collection even more valuable.

In the introduction to the anthology, Knobe and Nichols make wonderfully clear the basic tenants of experimental philosophy. According to Knobe and Nichols, historically one of the main issues in philosophy is determining how the mind works. Recently philosophers have tended to consult only their own intuitions about test cases and use them to determine how the mind works. But Knobe and Nichols argue that this method, while popular, is not as effective as employing evidence from alternative methods (e.g., experimental methods). A more fruitful way of doing philosophy uses the experimental methods of psychology to help understand how the mind works. However, Knobe and Nichols caution against misunderstanding the nature of the advice given by experimentalists. Almost no experimental philosopher recommends a total replacement of a priori theorizing with experiments. The advice, then, is for philosophers to "go after the important questions with everything we've got," including conceptual analyses and cognitive psychology (p. 14). The majority of papers in their anthology do exactly that.

The first section entitled "Cross Cultural Differences in Intuitions" consists of a pair of papers. In the first, Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich present evidence that might undermine the epistemological view they call Intuition Driven Romanticism. Intuition Driven Romanticism describes a group of epistemological theories that hold that a single set of correct epistemological norms is revealed, at least in part, by intuitions we have about specific cases. They argue that Intuition Driven Romanticism is threatened because some different groups of people have systematically different epistemic intuitions. These differences call into question whether a single set of epistemic norms is likely to emerge from our intuitions about specific cases. To give one example, Westerners (of European decent) and East Asians have systematically different intuitions about whether a person in a Gettier scenario knows. However, it is worth noting that they found some remarkable similarity in the intuitions between different groups of people and that the differences can be made to "disappear" by mildly altering the scenarios.

In the second paper, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich report cross-cultural differences in semantic intuitions. According to the authors, most philosophers assume they share intuitions with most people that are

consistent with a causal-historical theory of reference and inconsistent with a descriptivist theory of reference. However, they found that Westerners tend to have intuitions consistent with a causal-historical theory of reference whereas East Asians had intuitions consistent with a descriptivist theory of reference. Therefore, it appears that some philosophers are wrong about what intuitions most people have—indeed, some folk semantic intuitions fragment in predictable ways. These results pose a problem for deciding *which* (if any) set of intuitions should determine the correct theory of reference.

The second section, “Responsibility, Determinism, and Lay Intuitions” includes three papers. In the first, Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley report that people judge one can be morally responsible for actions that are totally out of one’s control. This speaks to the relevance of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities to folk judgments about moral responsibility. The Principle of Alternative Possibilities states one can be morally responsible for an action only if one could have done something other than what one in fact does. Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley did find that participants’ judgments were influenced by how constrained one is to act. However, responsibility judgments were also influenced by how much one identifies with the action. Specifically, agents were judged to be more responsible when there was (i) less constraint and (ii) more identification. One possible shortcoming of these studies is that the participants were asked if the person was responsible and not morally responsible. One could be responsible in the sense of being causally responsible without being morally responsible for (although, they found roughly the same effect with blame judgments). However, because identification was an important factor in responsibility judgments, these results suggest that factors in addition to the alternative possibilities are involved in folk judgments about responsibility. The take home message, then, is that people’s responsibility judgments are likely to be context dependent and influenced by a variety of factors.

The second paper offers evidence about people’s intuitions about determinism’s relationship to free will and moral responsibility. Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner offer some evidence that in some situations people make compatibilist friendly judgments that one can be free and responsible in a deterministic world. In the final paper of the section, Nichols and Knobe explore why people might have compatibilist intuitions. They find that affect can play an important role in generating intuitions about whether a person is morally responsible. In their studies, people were more likely to respond that one is morally responsible in concrete scenarios than in abstract ones and that increasing the amount of affect in concrete scenarios increased the likelihood that one would judge the person to be morally responsible.

Section three deals with folk psychology and moral cognition. The first paper in this section, authored by Joshua Knobe, reports that the moral valence of a side effect of an intended action can influence people's intentionality judgments of that side effect. This phenomenon suggests that the role of folk psychology may not always be to predict and explain behavior. Rather, intentional action judgment should be seen as a “tool used for determining how much praise or blame an agent deserves for her behaviors” (p. 141). In the second paper, Thomas Nadelhoffer contends that these results bear on legal issues. It looks like believing that the person performed a bad action leads one to be more likely to judge that the action was done intentionally. These results are worrisome because jurors may be illegitimacy biased when determining the intentionality of bad actions.

The final section gives some perspectives on the future of experimental philosophy. One possible future sees the fragmentation of some philosophically relevant intuitions. For example, Fiery Cushman and Alfred Mele suggest that there may be a plurality of folk concepts about intentional action. They report evidence for at least two folk concepts of intentional action. These two concepts are in part characterized by two different rules. The first rule states that a person performs action *A* intentionally if one desires that one *A-es* (given necessary background conditions like the absence of causal deviance). The other rule likewise treats *A-ing* with a desire to *A* as sufficient for *A-ing* intentionally (given necessary background conditions), but it also treats a justified belief that one will *A* (and one *A-es*) as sufficient for *A-ing* intentionally. Interestingly, they also find an order effect with Knobe's chairman cases where people are less likely to say that the chairman harms the environment intentionally when presented after a series of neutral or morally good side effects than when presented before the neutral or morally good cases. The order effect suggests that there may be an additional folk concept of intentional action that treats a desire to *A* as necessary for *A-ing* intentionally except for morally bad actions where a justified belief that one will *A* (and one *A-es*) is sufficient for *A-ing* intentionally.

Another perspective, offered by Jesse Prinz, sees that while armchair philosophy is a tool that can be used to investigate our concepts, philosophers should consult empirical data (i.e., do empirical philosophy) and in some instances perform their own experiments (i.e., do experimental philosophy). Why should philosophers be concerned about empirical data? If Prinz is right, philosophers gather observations. These observations often come in the form of intuitions participants have about particular cases. If intuitions of philosophers are observations—like observations in other sciences—then philosophical intuitions will neither

be the only nor the best way to go about investigating some philosophically important issues. Indeed, sometimes it will be more effective to explore some philosophically important questions using experimental data and experimental methodologies. However, much like Knobe and Nichols caution, Prinz thinks that philosophy cannot be based only on empirical experimentation because a substantial amount of armchair reflection is required to test hypothesis and interpret results. Indeed, Prinz is at length to argue against the recent rash of mottoes encouraging philosophers to set fire to their armchairs. Instead, Prinz simply thinks that the armchairs should not be hermetically sealed chambers.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong sees one part of the future of experimental philosophy as helping us understand how philosophical paradoxes are produced. In particular, he is concerned with the different pattern of responses observed between concrete and abstract cases (see Nichols and Knobe's chapter). Sinnott-Armstrong offers an interesting speculation that the differences in response patterns between abstract and concrete cases suggest that there are different processes involved in generating intuitions about concrete and abstract cases. When these two systems give conflicting results, we have philosophical paradoxes. If Sinnott-Armstrong's explanation is right, not only does that tell us something interesting about our psychology, but it also offers several ways to resolve philosophical paradoxes. However, Sinnott-Armstrong is skeptical that a satisfactory resolution to these paradoxes is forthcoming from his diagnosis of the source.

In the only chapter mostly critical of experimental philosophy, Ernest Sosa sees the future of experimental philosophy as not having any direct impact on the reliability of philosophical armchair intuitions. Rather, the conflicting intuitions that experimental philosophers sometimes find are best explained by the ambiguity that is inherent in languages. The predominate methodology in experimental philosophy uses descriptions of scenarios and then asks participants to respond to prompts. Because these are language based, language is ambiguous, and the participants are not experts in possession of clearly defined terms, it is likely the results are due to different understandings of the terms involved and not to some underlying differences in the nature of the concepts involved. So, the differences found in much of experimental philosophy are simply verbal and not substantive. Moreover, because intuitions across a variety of domains are reliable and most results in experimental philosophy only show how people use terms, the results of experimental philosophy do not speak against the reliability of the philosophical use of intuitions.

In closing, one of the most exciting aspects of experimental philosophy is that new, interesting, and controversial data are rapidly produced in a

variety of philosophically important areas—a sign of a healthy discipline that is likely to produce many more interesting results. Knobe and Nichols have put together a collection of some seminal papers in experimental philosophy. The anthology quickly and effectively introduces the reader to the variety of methods, topics, criticisms, and results in experimental philosophy. Reading the papers contained in this collection will give an excellent sense of what most experimental philosophers claim to be doing. Perhaps equally important, because experimental philosophy is often misunderstood and misinterpreted, one who reads the papers contained in the anthology will become familiar with what experimental philosophers *do not* claim to be doing. In sum, Knobe and Nichols's anthology is an essential introduction to experimental philosophy.

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Zdzisława Piątek, *Ekofilozofia [Ecophilosophy]*, Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press 2008, pp. 196, ISBN 83-233-2524-6.

While she does derive her own ecophilosophical conception from naturalism, Zdzisława Piątek does not see its source in the semi-mystical ecophilosophy of Henryk Skolimowski. This is because his undoubtable contribution to popularizing the motto of “reconciliation with nature” cannot make up for the weakness of the scientific grounds on which it is based. For those readers who uncritically subscribe to Skolimowski’s ecophilosophical theory, it can come as a bit of a surprise that Piątek’s theory is derived from a rival conception of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, who sees three planes of reference to the human relationship with nature, each governed by different rules: philosophy, ecophilosophy or ecosophy. The last of them is ecological wisdom, i.e. the practical, real-life usage of the theoretical knowledge taken from the other two levels. The author also supports her theory with Haeckel’s ideas on ecology, which include considerations on the economics of Nature – its natural balance. By deriving the term *ecology* term from the Greek word *oikos*-home, she also shows that for man this home is the whole planet.

In this context it becomes clear that science had quite a long distance to cover before it got to the point of respecting Nature for Nature itself, and not for the benefits it brings or may bring. Thus ecophilosophy is, in the author’s understanding, a natural result of scientific development, which has helped to recognize our place on Earth and has also pointed out the close interrelations among the elements of the natural world (the holistic

point of view). Following this train of thought, an interesting semantic stratagem was applied in the book which assigns to Nature a certain kind of autonomous existence and gives it a proper name, capitalized by the author not only as an expression of respect for Nature, but also a means of distinguishing this particular use from the ordinary uses of the word. This makes it clear that “Nature” refers to the entire biosphere, of which we are only a part.

Zdzisława Piątek takes the time to point out the oft-underestimated significance of the symbiotic relations between organisms for the evolutionary process. The cooperation of different organisms could become a basis for their further differentiation, perhaps even on a larger scale than by natural selection alone. The new symbiotic approach becomes the basis for the author’s original definition of ecophilosophy (p. 23). Within her approach ecophilosophy becomes the idea of cooperation or reconciliation between Man and Nature, of a symbiotic functioning of both these spheres of existence.

In the book we will also find critical references to the already formulated theories of ecophilosophy. For example, there is an analysis of the views of Krzysztof Lastowski, who in discussing two possible types of ecophilosophical considerations – in terms of outlook on life and in terms of science, assumes the impossibility of reconciling them, whereas Piątek’s own view is that they are in fact complementary – ecophilosophy should not remain closed off within institutional science, but should become part of the common outlook on life of the new era, which appeals to the principle of balanced and sustainable development of Nature and culture.

Piątek’s choice of the starting point for her own ecophilosophy is quite intriguing: she takes ethics as her point of departure. But while the ideas of Albert Schweitzer are to be found, to a greater or lesser extent, in practically every discussion that aims to unite ecology and philosophy, the presence of Twardowski’s ethics is at least surprising. Yet this combination turns out to be quite beneficial for the book. On the one hand, there are Schweitzer’s considerations, where we can note that lack of contradiction (pointed up by Piątek) between the scientific and the outlook on life approaches to the issues which today form the basis of ecophilosophy. One can easily perceive that with Schweitzer it is the mystic, rather than the scientific, that is the dominant mode of viewing the world. Twardowski’s ideas, on the other hand, provide the necessary balance in fulfilling at every turn the requirements of scientific discourse. The book allows the readers to trace how these two seemingly contradictory and, in addition, historically distant starting points give life to a truly modern understanding of ecophilosophy. However, this by no means signifies that the author accepts uncritically all the theses and

assumptions of both philosophers. The critical analysis of Schweitzer's views conducted in this book certainly deserves attention – pointing out and proving the naturalistic and moralistic fallacies in his considerations certifies to Piątek's innovative approach, and additionally inclines the reader to be more skeptical towards those considered to be authorities.

But while the principles of Schweitzer's ethics concerning the extra-human environment can in fact be applied here, although to a limited extent (the author herself qualifies that the fundamental value of Schweitzer's ethics in this case comes down to one principle – that of the open character of the respect for life principle), the situation is quite different where the intra-human relations are concerned. The principle of devotion and support is admittedly postulative in character, but even the author herself notes that if people cared to apply it in life, most conflicts would be solved much more effectively than with the help of legal regulations. Without a doubt, Schweitzer's ethics may become the axiological basis of the new philosophy, even in deriving its principles from the basic assumption that every life has intrinsic, non-instrumental value. The author finds justification for this view in the program of scientific ethics of Kazimierz Twardowski. Even though at first glance such a task might seem next to impossible, in the course of reading the book (p. 61-64) one can come to see it is a truly rational solution, which can in fact form the theoretical base for the author's ecophilosophical theory. After all, it was none other than Twardowski who substantiated the thesis that ethics is an extension of the self-preservation instinct. If man is a social "animal," then ethics, in order to serve his vital interests, offers advice on how to agree his own self-interest with society's best interests.

In chapter four the author clearly presents her ontological and epistemological postulations concerning Nature as a necessary reference point for human ways of both understanding and depicting the world. Piątek clearly points out that the naturalism that she opts for „does not reduce man to animal level, but rather enhances the status of animals and of that which comes from animals, and also humanizes that which is divine” (p. 93). Such a naturalism develops within the evolutionary paradigm, and ecophilosophy is its outcome at our present stage of cultural and scientific progress.

The book under discussion is not always simple to understand. To study it one needs at least an elementary grasp of genetics and biology. The reader's knowledge of these areas is verified especially in the subsections concerning “the molecular metaphysics of life,” where the author refers to the idea of independent “intelligence” of animate matter. The evolutionary paradigm also requires that the biosphere be treated as a whole (e.g. the idea of Gaia), to which certain features of subjectivity are ascribed, since within its framework similarities are more important than

differences. Looking at the text as a whole we can see that this is in fact a crucial claim, which allows the author to endorse (without falling into contradiction) the holistic point of view, where “superior” (more evolutionally advanced) or “inferior” organisms do not exist. Thus, passing value judgments on the organisms in the biosphere loses all sense and the need to work out a new ethic becomes obvious. That is why we have to agree with the author that the emergence of an ecophilosophy which refers to the idea of sustainable development is an expression of a certain maturity that man has come to in his contacts with Nature.

Going against the opinions proclaimed by radical ecologists, the book does not postulate any kind of withdrawal of man from the progress achieved in terms of material culture. The author’s position is that the cultural and the natural progress together through a co-evolution, consistent with the rules of Nature, according to which organisms develop together with their environment. The life functions of every organism transform the environment in which they live, and in this respect man is no different. Problems arise only when an organism is developing independently of the developmental possibilities of its environment. In this case there is no difference between a swarm of locusts, which by devouring everything around sentences itself to death by hunger, and the Maya civilization, which caused its own downfall in the very same way, by completely devastating its natural environment and thus making it impossible to produce the quantity of food necessary to survive.

Therefore it comes as no surprise that the book closes with a discussion of the idea of sustainable development in the context of ecophilosophy. This final part of the book starts with the author’s polemic against the view, common within the social sciences, which questions the need to treat Nature as an independent value in itself, and which regards the idea of sustainable development as a modern utopia. Piątek’s own vision is optimistic and full of faith in the collective human wisdom, which unconditionally supports the elimination of those threats that exceed the adaptive capabilities of man and of the biosphere as a whole. The author rightly notes that “a unique standing within Nature is something man must work for” (p. 158). In this way the strategy of sustainable development becomes, in a sense, a strategy for survival, which is signaled in the book. The view suggested by some authors (and subjected to criticism in this book) that the strategy of sustainable development is necessarily anthropocentric in character, which contradicts with the biocentric attitude of ecophilosophy, in view of the previous chapters turns out to be thoroughly wrong and cannot be rationally justified. The authors of the criticized opinions seemed simply not to notice that sustainable development in serving humankind must necessarily also benefit the biosphere as a whole.

The idea of reconciliation with Nature forms the cornerstone of the naturalistic ecophilosophy postulated by the author, an ecophilosophy which “defines the next stage of human moral development as the setting of such goals that are convergent not only with the interests of other people, but also with those of the other living creatures with whom we share the biosphere” (p. 181). It is not certain whether humanity will manage to achieve this goal, but the fact is that the biosphere will continue to exist with or without us, even though the conscious self-destruction of our species might not be anyone’s goal. If we consider the message of this book we cannot help but notice that humanity has a rather limited freedom of choice: either self-destruction or sustainable development.

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Krzysztof Rotter, *Gramatyka w dobie sporu o podstawy matematyki. Esej o drugiej filozofii Wittgensteina* [*Grammar in the Age of the Dispute over the Foundations of Mathematics: an Essay on Wittgenstein’s Second Philosophy*], Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski 2006, pp. 220, ISBN 978-83-7395-156-3.

The book written by Krzysztof Rotter is an outstanding title in the growing number of Polish publications devoted to Ludwig Wittgenstein and his late philosophy. It is a popular view nowadays to treat both periods of Wittgenstein's philosophical activity as two parts of one general approach, or at least as two not so different ways of fixing the same problems. This view is represented in Poland by Maciej Soin (2001) who proposed to look at the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* as two versions of the realization of the anti-metaphysical program.

Rotter's standpoint is different. The author underlines the importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics as that aspect which unifies his apparently fragmented philosophical inheritance. The view on the problems of mathematics remains continuous: what was written in the *Tractatus* on this matter was not recanted in later notes and lectures, but rather enforced and developed.

Rotter’s particular interest lies with the so-called “middle period,” namely the years 1928-1934, which was a time of dynamic changes and endless reformulations of Wittgenstein's vision (p. 7). The author presents his philosophy within a wider perspective – the history of the idea of philosophical grammar: from medieval treatises of William of Conches, Peter Helias (12th c), and Thomas of Erfurt (13th c), through Leibniz,

Brentano, Frege, Husserl, Peirce, and Meinong to Josef Schächter, Paul Lorenzen and Noam Chomsky (pp. 11-41, 134). The Wittgensteinian notion of grammar inscribed onto this list by Rotter loses its superficial peculiarity.

The book is divided into five essays which are thematically connected and intuitively ordered. The first part, called "Philosophical grammar over the ages," sketches the historical perspective; the second one, "Intuitionism as a critical philosophy," is devoted to Brouwer's approach to the problem of the foundations of mathematics; the third essay, labeled "From intuitionism to pragmatism," describes the shift in Wittgenstein's thinking in its two aspects: the radicalization of his constructivistic approach and the turn towards pragmatism. In the fourth essay, "On formalistic grounds of Wittgenstein's second philosophy," Rotter points up Wittgenstein's debt to the so-called "older formalists." The last part, "The problem of linguistic ambiguity in philosophical grammars of Wittgenstein and Schächter" is—as the title suggests—devoted to the more detailed problem of ambiguity.

There is a common opinion, taken from Bertrand Russell, that Wittgenstein returned to philosophy and became an intuitionist after he had listened to Brouwer's lecture in 1929. Rotter gives competent and detailed arguments against this thesis. He claims not only that the *Tractatus* cannot be regarded as a work of logicism, but also that it is based on intuitionistic and constructivistic grounds. This particularly regards the problem of infinity and its formulations. Hence it must be acknowledged that Wittgenstein was an intuitionist from the very beginning of his philosophical career.

That Wittgenstein's thoughts on infinity included a.o. in *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, presented to Russell in 1930, are close to the ideas of Brouwer is not as strange as the fact that Russell did not notice this similarity before, namely after he had read the *Tractatus*. (p. 73)

The philosophical shift Wittgenstein had made left his view on the foundations of logic and mathematics relatively untouched, it only made them more evident in the new context.

The philosophy of the *Tractatus* is founded on the concept of a series of forms. The notion of a series is taken, as Rotter indicates, from the earlier works of Frege (the logician of Jena had reduced the mathematical concept of set to the concept of series which meant that for every element of a set a method of construction had to be given, but he gave up this intuitionistic rule in favour of more liberal and therefore much more problematic ideas) (pp. 69-70). It is based on the notion of an operation which transfers one term of a series to the next one. Wittgenstein in his early period tried to apply this concept to propositions.

He failed, however, to find an operation which – similarly to addition of unity – would generate every proposition [...]. In the most general approach, a logical operation is a procedure of the construction of particular terms of a series of forms «the ones from the others». It does not characterize a general form (some common property of every term of a series) but only «the difference of forms» between subsequent terms, which is its constitutive feature. Thanks to this operations are not idempotent and the process of construction of subsequent distinct forms (terms of a series) can go on infinitely. (pp. 70-71)

Rotter shows that the logic of early Wittgenstein, as well as his mathematics, is intentionally founded on the concept of complete induction. Thus, contrary to his great predecessors, Frege and Russell, who tried to rule out this concept according to the program of logicism, the author of the *Tractatus* considered it as a cornerstone of his own philosophy. He wrote in *Notebooks*:

The concept «and so on» symbolized by «...» is one of the most important of all and like all the others infinitely fundamental. For it alone justifies us in constructing logic and mathematics «so on» from the fundamental laws and primitive signs. The «and so on» makes its appearance right away at the very beginning of the old logic when it is said that after the primitive signs have been given we can develop one sign after another «so on.» Without this concept we should be stuck at the primitive signs and could not go «on.» (1979, pp. 89-90)

But the greatest contribution of Rotter's book is, in my opinion, the clear indication of the roots of the late Wittgensteinian concept of a “language-game.” It comes from the investigations of the ontological grounds of real numbers made by two eminent 19th century mathematicians: Eduard Heine and Carl Johannes Thomae. Heine, the collaborator of Georg Cantor, tried to avoid the metaphysical implications of the concept of irrational numbers as the limits of infinite series of rational numbers. The stipulation of the real existence of such limits follows radical consequences for ontology and opens the door to transfinitive arithmetics. The problem can be solved, in Heine's opinion, by taking the purely formalistic point of view. In his *Die Elemente der Functionlehre* he states: “I call numbers some sense-perceivable signs, so the question of their existence does not arise at all” (citation after Rotter, p. 118). Thomae reformulates this concept by replacing the material number-signs with sign-types and introduces the concept of *Zeichenspiel* or *Rechenspiel* (respectively: “sign-game” and “computation-game”). Both mathematicians disregarded the question of the meaning or the reference of arithmetical signs and therefore called themselves formalists. The following passage by Thomae clearly explains the main idea of the older formalists (adjective “older” is used to differentiate them from “formalism” in the sense of David Hilbert):

Mathematics is for a formalist just a game with signs (Spiel mit Zeichen), which are said to be empty. They are understood to have no content or meaning in a computation-game (Rechenspiel) except that which is given by the specific merging rules (Verknüpfungsregeln), namely the game rules (Spielregeln) which determine their behavior in the sign-game. A chess player treats his figures in a similar way in assigning to them the properties which determine their behavior in the game, so, in effect, the figures are only external signs of that behavior. (citation after Rotter, pp. 119-120)

Wittgenstein became familiar with ideas of the older formalists during his meetings with the members of the Vienna Circle, Friedrich Waismann in particular, and he quickly assimilated them. Rotter points out that the concept of sign-game was, without a doubt, a prototype of the concept of a language-game which emerged in that time, namely in 1930-31. The former already contained the three notions constitutive for the latter, namely: the idea of meaning as use in a game, the radical separation of syntax from semantics, and the idea of a game as the definition of basic concepts. Thomae had already noted, as did Wittgenstein after him, the two main functions of the game: “definitional” (introduction of new meanings to language through the construction of new terms or new sets of rules) and “educational” (presentation and explanation of the existing terms) (pp. 120-121).

The idea of “language-games” provided a new method of rational reconstruction of language, alternative to the previous one, which had been sketched in the Notebooks and the Tractatus. Rotter points out that this allowed Wittgenstein to focus on analyses of communicational actions rather than meanings of words. Hence the essence of Wittgenstein's shift is included in this change, namely in the change of understanding the very notion of rational reconstruction (pp. 80-81). Wittgenstein realized that we do not have any apriorical logic from which we could construct a series of possible propositions: the logic itself must be reconstructed by a posteriori investigations of our actual use of the language in particular situations. The shift is revealed in the transition from the question “What is the meaning of a word?” to the questions “What is an explanation of the meaning of a word; what does the explanation of a word look like?” which opens *The Blue Book*. The task of the philosopher is to describe the real way of using the words. He should not attempt to find any distinguished symbolism. “I want to say here – Wittgenstein writes – that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive.'” (1969, p. 18).

What is reconstructed in this way is grammar: the set of rules for applying words in particular circumstances (pp. 91-92). Hence the shift marks also a turn towards pragmatism. Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations give up the classical themes of traditional philosophy: meaning and language as adequacy, logical value, projecting the reality

(still present in the *Tractatus*). “The truth, like grammatical relations – like any other relation between a “sign-game” and “reality” – is a relation which has to be reconstructed on the grounds of externally and intersubjectively observable uses of utterances. Therefore the place of truth in the second philosophy of Wittgenstein is taken by a purely pragmatically understood multiplicity of relations of linguistic signs (usually called sentences) to the “extralinguistic” reality.” (p. 93).

Rotter's book presents the author of the *Tractatus* as a German philosopher. It places him between Frege and Lorenzen, casts some light on the period of intensive work in Vienna and the meetings with Waismann, with the problems of German mathematicians in the background. The middle period of Wittgenstein is sometimes called “calculational,” because at that time he understood the concept of grammar in terms of calculus. This point of view on the problem of language, precious for Rotter, was later abandoned: Wittgenstein turned towards a much less strict vision of meaning and language-games. Rotter notes this by writing that the important ideas elaborated between 1929-1932 were “almost totally marred.” Therefore his book is not only a “pure description” of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but also, to a certain extent, an explication of its undeployed possibilities. The author loyally warns that some of the threads of the last essay have been intentionally misinterpreted by him (p. 10). My only serious charge to *Gramatyka w dobie sporu o podstawy matematyki* is that these warnings should apply to a greater part of the book, though, I believe, the misinterpretational aspect of Rotter's other suggestions was unintentional. Plainly speaking, the book presents perfectly the reasons why Wittgenstein decided to give up the Tractarian view of language, his philosophy of mathematics, and his calculational vision of grammar from the middle period, but it can be, potentially, a source of misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's later philosophy in its “mature form” (I am aware that this term can be, potentially, a source of misunderstandings as well).

However, this objection must not be overestimated: all authors are free to present their material in a way they feel most comfortable with. Rotter – with extraordinary competence – describes the path which led Wittgenstein out of the apriorical logic of the *Tractatus*, but which he afterwards abandoned. The author of *Gramatyka w dobie sporu o podstawy matematyki* stays on this path and shows us where we can arrive with the concept of grammar as calculus.

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James Robert Brown, *Philosophy of Mathematics. A Contemporary Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures*, second edition, Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy, New York and London: Routledge 2008, pp. 245, ISBN10: 0-415-96047-9 (pbk), ISBN13: 978-0-415-96047-2 (pbk).

The book under review is an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. The author is aiming to address a broad audience – not only those with a mathematical background, but also students who come to philosophy with a humanities background and want to know a bit about science. The material chosen for presentation in the book consists of both traditional and classical theories in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as of some of the newer issues, in particular those associated with computers, experimentation, visualization and picture proofs. The result is that the book may find readers not only among novices to the subject, but also among professional philosophers of mathematics, as well as among mathematicians not working in philosophy.

This is the second edition; the first was published in 1999. They differ in several respects: numerous minor modifications and corrections have been made, a brief “Further Reading” section has been added to the end of each chapter and a new chapter on the continuum hypothesis has been added. More new examples have been added as well.

The book consists of a Preface and 12 chapters. Chapter 1 is introductory in character and ends with a list of the elements of *the mathematical image* (the standard conception of what mathematics is), thus indicating some features usually associated with mathematics as a science. Chapter 2 is devoted to Platonism. The author characterizes it, gives examples of mathematicians who expressed Platonistic views towards mathematics and indicates some problems and difficulties of this doctrine, in particular the problem of access to mathematical objects and the problem of the certainty of mathematical knowledge. The next chapter

consists of a discussion of the problem of picture-proofs in the light of Platonism. It is usually claimed that pictures are psychologically suggestive and pedagogically important but that they prove nothing. The author's opinion is different – he claims that pictures play the role of evidence and justification, that “some pictures are not really pictures, but rather windows to Plato's heaven” (p. 40).

Chapter 4 is devoted to the problem of applied mathematics. The following questions are considered: how does mathematics “hook onto” the world, are some of the objects referred to in various theories merely mathematical objects, is mathematics essential for science? An important distinction between representation and description is made. In this context the author discusses structuralism – a trend that is nowadays very popular and influential in the philosophy of mathematics.

Chapter 5 is devoted to the issues connected with Hilbert's programme and Gödel's incompleteness results and their philosophical meaning. Two opinions, namely that of Gödel and that of Penrose concerning the possibilities of the human mind and of the perspectives of the artificial intelligence are confronted.

In Chapter 6 the problem of the meaning and the role of notation in mathematics is considered. It is stated that notation reveals the properties of objects but that it does not create them. On the other hand, there are properties that can only be discovered using a particular notation. The considerations are illustrated by various examples from knot theory and number theory.

The chapter that follows is devoted to the problem of definition in mathematics. The famous debate between Frege and Hilbert is recounted and the views of Lakatos are presented, according to whom concepts are “proof-generated” – they change as we theorize about them.

In Chapter 8 one finds a discussion of the constructive approach to mathematics. The influence of Kant's ideas on Hilbert, Frege, Brouwer and Russell is indicated. The intuitionism of Brouwer is presented and some problems and difficulties connected with it are discussed.

Chapter 9 is devoted to Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas concerning mathematics. In connection with this the author considers the problem of proofs, pictures and procedures.

Chapter 10 brings interesting considerations devoted to computations, proofs and conjectures. The following problems are considered: what are the characteristics of mathematical evidence other than proof, what role does the computation of instances play, what other types of evidence besides computation could there be, what makes a mathematical conjecture a good one, what sorts of grounds could there be for accepting it?

Chapter 11 is devoted to the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). As shown by Gödel and Cohen it is undecidable in the axiomatic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, i.e., it can be neither rejected (Gödel) nor proved (Cohen) in it. Hence the problem whether it holds (is true) is still open – and is also an important challenge to the philosophy of mathematics. In his book Brown presents the (slightly modified version of) Freiling’s refutation of CH. On the margin of it the author states – as a moral – that “Picture proofs and thought experiments are a potential source of mathematical knowledge that is largely untapped. They ought to be explored and exploited” (p. 196).

The last chapter (12) develops the discussion of this idea. The author states that “there are many different ways of establishing mathematical truth. We know a handful: there may be indefinitely more. Mathematical research since Gödel has been under something of a cloud. The richness of mathematics has been seen as grounds for pessimism – at least in some quarters where it may be argued that even arithmetic is so rich that we cannot hope to capture it. But I see things quite differently: mathematics is so rich that it offers us techniques for solving *any* problem.” (p. 207)

The book is a very accessible, even entertaining presentation of the traditional and of the newer trends and conceptions in the philosophy of mathematics. It can be read by beginners and professionals alike – everyone is sure to find something of interest. The material is presented without superfluous technicalities and numerous examples additionally explain and illustrate the issues. The book is very well and clearly written and has been published with a lot of attention to detail. Many pictures in the text as well as the index make the reading easier. Also an extensive bibliography is included. Suggestions for further reading added to each chapter will help the reader to deepen his/her knowledge and to continue the study of the issues discussed in the book. It is in fact quite a pleasant introduction to the philosophy of mathematics that can be recommended to a broad audience.

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Joel Kupperman, *Ethics and Qualities of Life*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, pp. VIII+198, ISBN 9780195308198.

Joel Kupperman’s latest book, *Ethics and Qualities of Life*, is divided into two broad sections, the first focusing on “the practice of ethical thought” and the second on ethical theory. In each part of the book, Kupperman aims to provide original insights and arguments for virtually every

important part of normative ethical theory. Quite often he is successful in achieving this aim. However, given the scope of his ambition and the brevity of the work (198 pp.), the result is a significant yet somewhat uneven book.

Part I contains six chapters. The first four chapters form the core of Kupperman's argument against the recent focus on bizarre and unrealistic examples, and in support of focusing more on the "ways people ordinarily think (or do not think) about questions of right and wrong, and what can be rewarding in life" (p. 3). According to Kupperman, much of our moral lives consist of habitual patterns of thought, action, and feeling. However, certain events will occur in our lives that force us to rethink these patterns and habits. Kupperman claims that in these sorts of cases we face an existential choice, or a "choice in which there is a real chance an agent will break the pattern of a lifetime in a significant way, and that the choice will resonate in the agent's subsequent life" (p. 13). The typical context of an existential choice is a situation in which there is a *dislocation* (e.g. something that disrupts the pattern of a life) that will include a *construal* of that situation (e.g. a way of seeing, or conceptualizing the situation, a "seeing as..."), along with a *valencing* of the elements in the situation (e.g. a sense of various of these elements as either goods or evils). Furthermore, a person's character will play an important role in determining how she construes or valences a situation, and whether (and how) she will be moved to act given her moral judgments. Kupperman argues that each of these elements within an existential choice (dislocations, construals, valencing, and character) are centrally important to any complete account of ethical thought, even though they are often under-discussed or completely overlooked by many ethical philosophers today.

While these concepts have been given ample attention by virtue ethicists, Kupperman argues that they are of central importance for all moral philosophers, regardless of their theoretical commitments. He provides an interesting analysis of how so many ethical philosophers could overlook such centrally important concepts. Their mistake arises due to their almost exclusive focus on examples such as the Trolley Problem. In these sorts of cases, a person is confronted with a remarkably outlandish situation: there is a threat of imminent death, the choices are extremely limited, the facts about the people in danger are known with certainty, as are the results of choosing any of the available options. In such cases, we can discount the construal of the situation, for everyone will see the situation as obviously moral; likewise, most everyone will valence the situation in the same way (e.g. will see the death of anyone in the situation as a bad thing). Furthermore, these examples present a kind of dislocation that is so extreme that we need not focus on the question of how acting on

any of the available options will affect future behavior. Since all of these considerations are irrelevant in these kinds of cases, it is easy to assume that they are simply irrelevant to ethical philosophy. Kupperman believes that this conclusion is mistaken; if ethical philosophers would spend more time focusing on the kinds of moral decisions people actually make, and less on the outlandish examples, they should come to see this as well.

Chapters 5 and 6 mark a radical shift in Part I away from ordinary ethical thought and towards ethical theory. In chapter 5, Kupperman distinguishes morality from ethics, and argues that the social nature of morality gives it special features. According to Kupperman, ethics studies the features that go into making life good, both good in the sense of attaining a high level of well-being, and good in the sense of making decent, moral choices. Morality, on the other hand, “consists of injunctions of what should be done or not done that are (or should be) treated with special urgency, such that significant blame typically attaches itself to someone who knowingly goes counter to one of its injunctions” (p. 6). Morality has the function of “maintaining a social order that protects individuals and their property...” (p. 73). It is essentially social in nature, meaning in part that, “...any judgment that X is morally obligatory, permissible, or impermissible implies that it would be right for the entire society or subculture to subscribe to the judgment” (p. 67).

Kupperman ends this part of the book by arguing that when we examine our everyday moral code, we find three kinds of “theory-like” elements there: sympathy for beings who can suffer, respect for persons, and a commitment to fairness. He argues that the resources of ethical theory are necessary to defend and develop these three elements from our everyday moral thinking.

Kupperman’s main goal in the second part of the book is to defend an indirect version of consequentialism he calls *policy consequentialism*. A secondary goal is to reconcile policy consequentialism with some of the major insights and principles from both contractualist theories and Kantian theories.

Kupperman begins by focusing his attention on the three bases of ethical judgments that he considered at the end of part one: sympathy, fairness, and respect. He argues that while it is absolutely necessary that at least some moral judgments be based on considerations of fairness, and others must be based on considerations of respect, it is not possible to construct a moral code with either of these as a foundation for the others. The reason we cannot do this is that these concepts are often very hard to apply in any clear and straightforward way.

According to Kupperman, quality of life considerations provide a kind of grounding for these and all other ethical judgments. But he argues against the most simple and straightforward kind of grounding provided

by act-consequentialists. The main problem facing the act-consequentialist is that the future effects of our actions are simply unknown to us, and thus the act-consequentialist will be forced to say, "...that the theory should not be taken as, first and foremost, a theory about what we should do (given our limited knowledge). Rather, it should be taken as a theory of what, as it will turn out, was the best thing to do among our alternatives" (p. 103). Since we use a moral theory in order to decide what to do, act-consequentialism will be especially unhelpful in that regard. Kupperman also rejects certain versions of rule-consequentialism. He finds Lyons's famous argument for the collapse of rule-consequentialism to act-consequentialism to be convincing (p. 161). The only way to avoid this collapse is to obey optimistic rules to an unreasonable degree, thus undermining the consequentialist basis of rule-consequentialism.

Kupperman ultimately accepts *policy consequentialism*, which he describes as follows:

We could agree generally to follow familiar moral rules that seem to have proved their usefulness, and not to violate them lightly (i.e., without significant justification—what is requisite depends on the case) (p. 162).

Kupperman is driven to accept some version of consequentialism because he believes the logic of ordinary moral discourse is committed to the following three theses:

LC1. If what would have the best consequences is not the best thing for X to do, there must be a reason.

LC2. There are constraints, depending on the scenarios of what is at stake, on what can count as a reason for X's not doing what would have had the best consequences.

LC3. The only possible reason for not doing what would have the best consequences would be one that appeals to systems of attitudes, habits of mind, and/or policies (of which morality is one) that themselves promote important values (most of which can be put under the heading of human flourishing). These systems themselves are open to question, and it counts against any one of them in its present form if its existence (as prevalent in society) is not for the best (pp. 123-4).

Kupperman argues that any possible objection to these claims will turn out to rely on consequentialist considerations, thus establishing a "recursive" argument in support of consequentialism as the ultimate basis of ethical judgments (p. 124).

Kupperman spends a lot of time and effort to complicate this picture. For, just as it is incredibly difficult to determine what the effects of any particular action might be, it is even harder sometimes to determine the

effects of changing a policy or an accepted practice in society. One way of approaching these sorts of difficult cases is to rely on considerations of fairness or respect: rather than asking, “Will this new policy make things for the best?” we should instead ask, “Is this new policy fair?” or “Does this new policy give equal respect to everyone?” Thus, Kupperman believes that the various moral theories that are so often seen as enemies instead should be considered parts of a more complete whole.

There is much to admire in this work. As usual, Kupperman supports many of his claims with the results of psychological research; also, his long standing interest in eastern philosophy is present here as well, and allows him to support his claims in interesting and novel ways. This is a refreshing change from work ordinarily done by analytically trained philosophers. Furthermore, part I is forcefully argued and should cause many ethicists today to rethink what the aim of an ethical theory ought to be. Kupperman is surely correct in claiming that all ethicists should pay more attention to the ways people actually do think about ethical problems if their theories are to be complete. And Kupperman’s argument for the “logic of consequentialism” is interesting and deserves a deeper, more fully realized statement and defense.

The book is not without issues. The first issue is that Kupperman does not engage the recent literature very much. For example, his discussion of consequentialism relies heavily on the work of R. M. Hare, but he never discusses the work of other influential people, e.g., Peter Railton, Fred Feldman, Roger Crisp, Brad Hooker, or Liam Murphy; his discussion of contractualism does not go in any detailed way into the ideas of T. M. Scanlon; and when discussing the evolution of Kantian theories, he does not mention the work of Christine Korsgaard, Thomas Nagel, or Thomas Hill. A cursory glance at the bibliography reveals that Kupperman cites only ten works published from 2000 or beyond. Given that so much work has been produced in this time that is both directly relevant to his argument and is of high quality, this lack of engagement is seriously problematic.

Three problems emerge due to this oversight. The first is that Kupperman often seems to be redesigning the wheel when he makes a point that is by now familiar, but does not indicate that the point is, in fact, familiar. For example, Kupperman spends an entire chapter (chapter 11) arguing that all three theories he considers have undergone changes over time. This is hardly news to anyone working in the field. Furthermore, James Sterba has recently argued¹ that not only have the theories evolved, but they have also converged, thus making practical ethical problems a

¹ In *The Triumph of Practice over Theory in Ethics*, 2004, Oxford University Press.

priority over ethical theory. Kupperman simply omits any discussion of this fascinating and clearly relevant argument.

Second, Kupperman is often more dismissive of views than he has any right to be, given his lack of engagement with recent attempts to meet the problems he raises. For example, his argument against act-consequentialism relies on the uncertainty of the consequences of our actions; in making this point, he interprets Bales's 1971 argument in "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" as establishing that the only thing an act consequentialist can properly judge is the moral status of a past action (once the consequences are known), and simply cannot say anything about the moral status of actions facing a person right now. Many act consequentialists have faced this problem and have offered theories that are meant to help us around it, yet Kupperman is silent about them. Likewise, the argument Kupperman uses against rule consequentialism is from Lyons's work written in 1965; Brad Hooker's recent defense of rule utilitarianism should surely be discussed in connection with this problem, but is not even mentioned.

Third, and more worrisome for Kupperman than the above two problems, however, is the fact that the true originality of Kupperman's work is often hard to discern, since Kupperman has not related his ideas to those of people working on similar projects. For example, both Peter Railton and Roger Crisp have independently argued for a kind of indirect consequentialist theory, and both argue for the importance of the virtues for such a theory, thus making these theories appear similar to Kupperman's theory. Kupperman does stress the social nature and foundation of a moral code much more than they have done, and uses this social nature of the moral code to provide unique and interesting defenses of consequentialism. But by not engaging the literature in any meaningful way, he makes it much too easy to overlook this originality.

A second issue is that there is a lack of cohesion between the book's two parts. The first section contains an argument for the importance of character, valencing and construals for ethical theory; yet the second part seems to have abandoned these concepts for the most part. A convincing argument for their necessity in ethical theorizing would have been established had Kupperman gone on to use them as a vital part of his arguments in part II. The fact that he can argue in part II without making much reference to them speaks against the argument contained in part I. More generally, the differences between the ideas contained in parts I and II are so vast that it makes one wonder whether these two parts should not constitute separate works.

I want to stress that these two criticisms are not entirely negative. Indeed, they both stem from a desire to understand better the ideas and

arguments that Kupperman advances. They are interesting and worth further development. Unfortunately, they are underdeveloped and not placed in a clear enough context for their true force to be fully felt. Hopefully Kupperman will spend more time on these ideas in the future, for ethical philosophy would be sure to benefit if he did.

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